Euthyphro Day 2

Here is a blog post where I explain the various different definitions of 'pious' in Euthyphro.

In this one, I explain the consequences of either solution to Euthyphro's dilemma.

In class today, I talked about the importance of conditional statements, such as "If P, then Q", or "If something is pious, then it is loved by the gods".  Conditional statements can be used to express causal relationships (e.g., If it rains, then the sidewalk gets wet).  We can also use conditional statements to express the relationship between genus and species: all poodles are dogs, all squares are rectangles and all OC citizens are CA citizens.  Conditional statements are important in philosophy.  Consider this argument:

If you are in Irvine, you are in CA.

Las Vegas is not in CA.

Therefore, Las Vegas is not in Irvine

The first premise of this argument is a conditional statement.  Many arguments include conditional statements.  

Consider now the logical form called 'introduction of a biconditional':  

If P, then Q.  

If Q, then P.  

Therefore, P if and only if Q.  

This is a valid logical form that can be used to express a vicious circle.  The problem with a vicious circle is not that it is illogical.  Rather, vicious circles fail to provide any new information.

Euthyphro, Day 1

Hello! For previous blog posts about Euthyphro, please follow this link or this other link.

Plato's Euthyphro is all about piety.  Socrates asks Euthyphro (the title character) what it means to be pious.  In general, to be pious means to be respectful and reverent towards divinity.  Socrates rejects the first three definitions provided for various reasons (see blog posts above).  


During discussion we considered whether we might avoid these kinds of criticisms by defining what is pious in terms of either 1) the intention of the person performing a pious act or 2) conditions for piety relative to a specific god.  In the case of 2, then we reject Socrates' desire for a single form or single conceptual definition for piety.  In the case of 1, then it seems like we avoid contradictions unless the person performing the action has contradictory intentions (e.g., slaughtering an animal is meant to appease one god while simultaneously defying another.  However, if we join both of these conditions together, we can avoid contradiction.  However, Socrates is likely to reject this notion because it does not provide a single unified definition of piety.

At this point, we might consider whether all definitions need to be unified in such a manner...